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Abstract— In a typical mobile ad hoc network, mobile
computing devices wander autonomously and communicate
via temporary links in a self-organized computing system
without any central administrator or infrastructure sup-
port. To support truly ad hoc impromptu communication
among such uncoordinated devices, a data multipath rout-
ing algorithm can be used because there is no need to rely
on a centralized encryption facility (e.g., a PKI server) or
complicated distributed keying protocols. In this paper,
we propose a data multipath routing algorithm called Mul-
tipath TCP Security (MTS) to enhance the data security.
In MTS, the source node adaptively chooses the available
routes rather than exhaustively testing the “stored routes”
one by one. Simulation results show that our algorithm pro-
vides a reasonably good level of security and performance.
Index Terms— TCP, wireless security, ad hoc networks,
multipath routing, interception rates.
I. INTRODUCTION
A mobile ad hoc network is a dynamically self-
organizing network without any central administrator or
infrastructure support. If two nodes are not within the
transmission range of each other, other nodes are needed
to serve as intermediate routers for the communication be-
tween the two nodes. Moreover, mobile devices wander
autonomously and communicate via temporary links in
such an ad hoc wireless network. Thus, frequent change
of network topology is a tough challenge for many im-
portant issues, such as routing protocol robustness, per-
formance degradation resiliency, and data security.
In ad hoc wireless networks, communicating data is
vulnerable to lots of potential attacks due to their charac-
teristics of having dynamic topology, limited bandwidth
and energy constraints. Indeed, data security is an impor-
tant issue in such environment. In general, the attacks are
classiﬁed as passive and active. In passive attacks, the
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attackers attempt to discover valuable information within
their transmission range. On the other hand, active attacks
attempt to disrupt the operation of communication. In this
paper, we focus on passive attacks, which are a muchmore
serious problem in ad hoc wireless networks due to their
stealthy nature. Speciﬁcally, since all nodes are sharing
the same wireless medium, the nodes are exposed to a po-
tentially insecure environment and can be easily attacked
in a more complicated manner when compared to central
wireless networks, e.g., cellular wireless networks. Con-
sequently, it is usually infeasible to use techniques such as
IPSec, TLS, etc. in ad hoc wireless networks.
Recently, multipath routing algorithms have been in-
troduced to enhance data conﬁdentiality in ad hoc wire-
less networks [1], [5], [8], [14]. The essence of these
algorithms is that data is transmitted via multiple paths
to prevent some ﬁxed unauthorized nodes from intercept-
ing useful information. Intuitively, multipath routing al-
gorithms are simple and efﬁcient because no encryption is
needed and data is “split” among different routes to min-
imize or even disable potential captures by unauthorized
users. In [1], existing multiple paths are used to increase
the robustness of conﬁdentiality. All data is transmitting
along these paths concurrently. In [5], one path is used as
the core path to deliver data and the other paths are alter-
natives (i.e., once the core path is broken down, an alter-
native path is nominated to deliver data). However, these
two protocols ignore an important characteristic of ad hoc
wireless networks: frequent topology change, which leads
to one or more used paths to break down or the backup
paths to be stale.
In this paper, we propose a novel multipath routing al-
gorithm called Multipath TCP Security (MTS) to combat
the passive attacks in ad hoc wireless networks. Com-
pared with other multipath routing protocols, MTS has
two signiﬁcant characteristics. First, on receiving the
route check packets, the source node adaptively changes
the current route to be the fastest one. That is, the set
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of routes used is not ﬁxed. It can be changed dynam-
ically. By contrast, in other protocols, a new route is
triggered to be active only when the old route could not
work any more. Second, when the ﬁrst route request
(RREQ) packet reaches the destination node, the route
reply (RREP) packet is immediately transmitted to the
source node without any delay. On the other hand, the des-
tination node receives other RREQ packets without trig-
gering RREP packets. Under extensive NS-2 simulations
with realistic TCP trafﬁc, MTS demonstrates a remarkable
improvement in the data security as well as TCP perfor-
mance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the
next section, we brieﬂy outline the related work. In Sec-
tion III, we describe the proposed algorithm—Multipath
TCP Security (MTS). Simulation results are presented and
discussed in Section IV. Finally, we conclude in Section
V.
II. RELATED WORK
Designed for ad hoc wireless networks, DSR [9] and
AODV [15] are two well-known routing protocols. In [2],
several routing protocols are compared using UDP traf-
ﬁc. In [3], [4], the TCP performance degradation due to
link failures is investigated. To the best of our knowledge,
there is little investigation on TCP performance over mul-
tipath routing. Thus, it is an interesting problem to study
the TCP performance, especially the TCP security over
multipath routing in ad hoc wireless networks.
Many multipath routing approaches [6], [7], [10], [11],
[12], [16], [17] have been studied recently. Tsirgos and
Haas [16], [17] have developed an analytical framework
for evaluating multipath routing algorithms in ad hoc
wireless networks. SMR [6], which is an extension of
DSR and uses similar route discovery method as in DSR,
builds multiple paths by forwarding duplicate RREQs
having different incoming link than the ﬁrst RREQ. In
SMR, only the source node has alternative paths. Unfortu-
nately, [7] shows that SMR behaves worse than using only
single path with TCP trafﬁc. The reason is that when TCP
packets are being transmitted concurrently, TCP reacts to
RTT sensitively and the out-of-order packets will lead to
unnecessary congestion control.
To tackle this problem, Lim [7] proposes a backup path
scheme based on SMR. The algorithmic improvement is
that only one path is the current route and the other paths
are for backup paths. Once the current route is broken
down, the backup path is switched to be the primary route.
The other multipath routing protocols in [11], [12] (DSR
extensions) and [10] (AODV extension) provide all in-
termediate nodes in the primary route with alternative
paths. Thus, when the route is broken, the intermedi-
ate nodes can be rescued by alternative paths. There is
one common feature in most existing multipath routing
protocols—among all routes, one is for use and the others
are in the waiting list. When the current route is broken,
another one is chosen to be the route from the waiting list.
Security over multipath protocols [1], [5], [8], [14] have
also been studied recently. In [1], [14], existing multi-
ple paths are already known and can be used immediately.
The security is provided by introducing redundant infor-
mation to the divided data. The enhanced security comes
with a cost of received efﬁciency. In [5], the idea of mul-
tipath discovery is similar to [8], which applies to wired
networks. The idea is that the intermediate nodes are not
allowed to send RREPs to the source node and when the
destination node receives the ﬁrst RREQ, it waits for some
time to receive other RREQs in order to compute disjoint
paths within some hop difference. After ﬁnding multiple
paths, one path is considered as important and the other
paths are alternatives. However, the frequent topology
change leads to the backup paths to be stale.
III. THE PROPOSED ALGORITHM
In this section, we ﬁrst present an overview of the main
features of our proposed algorithm, called Multipath TCP
Security (MTS). We then introduce the key steps in detail.
A. Protocol Overview
Compared with other multipath routing protocols, the
main distinguishing feature of our proposed algorithm
is that the source node adaptively chooses the available
routes rather than exhaustively testing the “stored routes”
one by one. That is, the current route for an active TCP
session is not ﬁxed but is dynamically changed over time.
Speciﬁcally, the proposed MTS algorithm ﬁnds routes
on-demand using a route discovery procedure. The source
node tries to discover disjoint and loop-free routes. The
destination node keeps sending checking packets periodi-
cally to make sure if these paths are still alive. Thus, the
source node can adaptively choose one of these legitimate
paths to replace the current route, if any of the former is
found to be better in enhancing the data security.
B. Route Discovery in MTS
Since no permanent route is stored in any node in the
network, the source node initiates a route discovery proce-
dure by generating a route request (RREQ) packet when it
has packets to send to the destination node. The RREQ in-
cludes the following information: packet type, source ad-
dress, destination address, broadcast ID, hop count from
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the source, and list of intermediate nodes. Whenever the
source node generates a RREQ, the broadcast ID is in-
cremented by one. Thus, the source and destination ad-
dresses, together with the broadcast ID, uniquely identify
this RREQ packet. The source node broadcasts the RREQ
to all nodes within its transmission range. These neigh-
boring nodes will then relay the RREQ to other nodes in
the same fashion.
As the RREQ is broadcast in the whole network, some
nodes may receive several copies of the same RREQ.
An intermediate node will not relay the duplicate RREQ
by checking the broadcast ID, source and destination ad-
dresses. If a RREQ has been received before, the interme-
diate node simply drops it; otherwise, the RREQ is stored
in the intermediate node and then forwarded to the neigh-
bors after several book-keeping tasks are done: caching
the broadcast ID to make sure not to receive the copies
of this RREQ; inserting its own address into the list of
intermediate nodes; increasing the hop count by one; con-
structing the reverse path according to the information of
the RREQ. The RREQ relaying process continues until
the RREQ reaches the destination node. Even in the case
where an intermediate node has a fresh route to the desti-
nation node, it has to relay the received RREQ.
Eventually, the destination node receives several copies
of the RREQ from the same source via different routes.
Upon receiving the ﬁrst RREQ, the destination node
generates a route reply (RREP) packet, which includes:
packet type, source address, destination address, route re-
ply ID, hop count, and list of intermediate nodes. The
RREP is unicast to the source along the reverse path.
When the destination node receives other copies of the
RREQ, it ﬁrstly checks if they are disjoint paths (elabo-
rated in the following section) and then stores the distin-
guishing information about the disjoint paths. In order to
save space, the number of disjoint paths is not more than
ﬁve in our current conﬁguration.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how the RREQ is broadcast
and the RREP is unicast in an ad hoc wireless network. It
should be noted that several reverse paths are constructed
leading toward the destination. Because the copies of
RREQ are not simply discarded, the destination node can
make full use of the information to construct the reverse
paths.
C. Loop Freedom and Disjoint Paths
Sequence numbers are used for ensuring loop free-
dom. Every node maintains a monotonically increasing
sequence number for itself. Furthermore, each node main-
tains the highest known sequence number for the desti-
nation in the routing table, i.e., the destination sequence
S
D
Propagation of RREQ packet
Construction of reverse Path
Fig. 1. Broadcasting of RREQ.
S
D
Propagation of RREP
Fig. 2. Unicasting of RREP.
number, which is monotonically increasing too. A higher
destination sequence number means more recent routing
information. Every node keeps the latest route to the des-
tination according to the information of the destination se-
quence number.
Since the intermediate node only receives the ﬁrst copy
of RREQ and drops other copies, this mechanism makes
sure that the paths before the destination node are dis-
joint. However, the destination node receives all copies
of RREQ, leading to paths that are possibly not disjoint.
Figure 3 illustrates the route discovery process. As can
be seen, nodes b and c are the neighbors of the destina-
tion node. The paths terminated at nodes b and c are dis-
joint. Unfortunately, the paths S-a-b-D and S-a-b-c-D are
not disjoint. To tackle this problem, we use the follow-
ing rule [10] to check disjoint paths at the destination: if
every node on a path ensures that all paths to the destina-
tion from that node differ in their next and last hops, then
the two paths are disjoint.
D. Route Checking in MTS
Because the wireless channel is time varying, the dis-
covered routes may not be useful after a while. Our idea
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Fig. 3. Paths can possibly be not disjoint.
is to let the destination node periodically transmit check-
ing packets to make sure that the discovered routes are
still legitimate. The checking period depends on the co-
herence time of the fading/shadowing conditions and typi-
cally two to four seconds is acceptable [5]. During the life
time of a communication session, the source node can re-
ceive several checking packets periodically from the desti-
nation node and thus, it can choose the best route available
accordingly.
We choose at most ﬁve candidate paths in the destina-
tion for route checking. These checking packets are peri-
odically transmitted to the source along the disjoint paths
by the destination node. Each checking packet includes
the following information: packet type, checking packet
ID, hop count, and list of intermediate nodes. Whenever
the ﬁve checking packets are sent out concurrently, the
checking packet ID is increased by one. When the inter-
mediate node receives the checking packets, it caches the
checking packet ID as the entry ID to the destination. This
entry ID is used to check if the route is fresh or not. Fig-
ure 4 shows how the checking packets are unicast to the
source along the different disjoint paths and consequently,
the forward paths are constructed.
If some checking packets cannot reach the source node,
a checking error packet is sent to the destination (the same
mechanism as route error (RERR) [15]). Then the destina-
tion node deletes the failed path and chooses another path
if available. When a new RREQ packet (having larger
broadcast ID) reaches the destination, all the existing le-
gitimate paths are ﬂushed.
Propagation of checking packet
S
D
Construction of forward path
Fig. 4. Route checking.
E. Route Update and Maintenance
When the checking packets are received, the source
node chooses the best path to update. We use a simple
principle to judge which path is the best—the route of the
ﬁrst arrived checking packet used is considered the best.
Since the wireless channel quality is time varying, the best
path varies over time.
The feedback from the MAC layer can also be used to
detect the connectivity of the link. When a node notiﬁes
that its downstream node is out of its transmission range,
the node generates a route error (RERR) to its upstream
node until it reaches the source node. The source node
then triggers a new route discovery procedure.
IV. PERFORMANCE RESULTS
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the simulation environ-
ment used in our study, followed by the deﬁnitions of the
performance metrics. We then discuss the results in detail.
A. Simulation Environment
Our simulations are implemented in Network Simula-
tor (NS-2) [13] from Lawrence Berkeley National Labo-
ratory (LBNL) with extensions for wireless links form the
Monarch project at Carnegie Mellon University. The sim-
ulation parameters are as follows:
• number of nodes: 50;
• testing ﬁeld: 1000m× 1000m;
• mobile speed: uniformly distributed between 0
and MAXSPEED (we choose MAXSPEED =
2, 5, 10, 15, 20m/s, respectively);
• mobility model: random way point model (when the
node reaches its destination, it pauses for several sec-
onds, e.g., 1s, then randomly chooses another des-
tination point within the ﬁeld, with a randomly se-
lected constant velocity);
• trafﬁc load: TCP Reno trafﬁc source;
• radio transmission range: 250 m; and
• MAC layer: IEEE 802.11b.
Each simulation is run for 200 seconds and repeated for
5 times. We compared three protocols in our simulations:
DSR, AODV, and our proposed MTS.
B. Performance Metrics
We designate one randomly selected intermediate node
as an eavesdropping node in our simulations. This node
performs the same procedures as other legitimate nodes to
relay packets but it also collects unauthorized data within
its radio range. The interception ratio [5] is used as the
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main performance metric to measure the conﬁdentiality.
The interception ratio is deﬁned as follows:
Ri =
Pe
Pr
(1)
where Ri is the interception ratio, Pe is the total number
of packets successfully eavesdropped, and Pr is the total
number of packets arrived at the destination.
Intuitively, if more nodes relay packets during the TCP
session, less packets are eavesdropped by the single ma-
licious node. Thus, the number of participating nodes is
also an important metric. We deﬁne a “participating node”
as any intermediate node which has relayed at least one
packet during the session.
Figure 5 demonstrates the situation where a number of
participating nodes in the communication have different
speeds. As can be seen, the proposed MTS algorithm has
the largest number of participating nodes. The reason is
that several routes can be chosen by the source node in
our algorithm. The source node chooses different routes
when the route checking packets are received. Thus, the
security level provided is higher.
Another useful metric is the standard deviation of num-
ber of relayed packets. This metric is used to measure
the difference among the numbers of received packets in
all participating nodes. However, the result from the ab-
solute value of the number of received packets is in no
way comparable between different routing protocols. It
is because the total received packets at destination and the
received packets by the intermediate nodes are different in
every run. Even in the same routing protocol, the absolute
values are not the same in different scenarios. Thus, we
ﬁrstly get the sum of all received packets by participating
nodes, denoted by α:
α =
N∑
i=1
βi (2)
where N is the number of participating nodes and βi is the
number of received packets of node i. Although a packet
should be relayed several times before reaching the des-
tination, we focus on not the packet itself but the times.
Normalization of these values so as to obtain the percent-
age γ of received packets is the second step, i.e., the num-
ber of received packets divides the sum in each participat-
ing node:
γi =
βi
α
(3)
After normalization, the values are between 0 and 1. They
are percentage in the total times of relay. Thirdly, the stan-
TABLE I
NORMALIZATION OF THE RECEIVED PACKETS IN THE
PARTICIPATING NODES
Node ID β γ
2 10581 34.70%
3 283 0.93%
17 1 0.00328%
21 3886 12.75%
23 1 0.00328%
28 15458 50.70%
36 275 0.90%
45 1 0.00328%
α Standard Deviation
30486 19.60%
dard deviation is calculated by the percentage values:
σ =
√∑N
i=1 (γi − γi)2
N
(4)
The last step is to calculate the average of standard devi-
ation in different scenarios. Table I shows how to calcu-
late the standard deviation in one scenario with DSR. As
can be seen, eight nodes participate in the communication.
In the upper part of the table, the ﬁrst column shows the
name of the node; the second column shows the number of
received packets by each node; after calculating the sum
of the second column, the third column can be calculated.
The last column is the normalized values to calculate the
standard deviation. In the lower part, the sum and stan-
dard deviation results are shown. Figure 6 shows that our
algorithm has the lowest standard deviation, which means
that the relay process does not rely on some participating
node.
The last performance metric is the highest intercep-
tion ratio. The largest number of received packets should
be Pe in Equation 1. This metric is to demonstrate the
worst case, i.e., the most dependent node is the eavesdrop-
per. Figure 7 shows that the highest interception ratio is
the lowest in our algorithm, when compared to DSR and
AODV.
C. Results
As mentioned before, when compared with DSR and
AODV, our algorithm has the highest number of partici-
pating nodes, lowest standard deviation of number of re-
layed packets and lowest highest interception ratio. Thus,
the eavesdropper has relatively low possibility to get more
information in our algorithm. At the same time, our algo-
rithm does not much depend on one or several nodes. This
also ensures the conﬁdentiality.
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Fig. 5. The number of participating nodes under different speeds.
Fig. 6. The standard deviation of number of relayed packets.
To evaluate TCP performance in different routing pro-
tocols, we compare them using four metrics:
• Average End-to-End Delay: the interval between
sending by the source node and receiving by the des-
tination node, which includes the processing time
and queuing time.
• Throughput: the successfully received TCP packets
at the destination node.
• Delivery Rate: the ratio of packets reaching the des-
tination node to the total packets generated at the
source node.
• Control Overhead: the total routing packets.
Figure 8 shows the average end-to-end delay of each
protocol. It should be noted that the delay is effective de-
lay of the packets that actually arrive at the destinations.
We can see that DSR has lower delay than AODV. The rea-
son is that DSR caches recently used routes and AODV is
an on-demand protocol. As MTS always chooses the best
route, it has the lowest delay.
The TCP throughput of each protocol over the simula-
tion time is shown in Figure 9. Obviously, since DSR has
some idle time, it has lower throughput, especially when
Fig. 7. The highest interception ratio.
the speed is large. On the other hand, MTS has higher
throughput than AODV due to the best route chosen. Al-
though our algorithm has much more number of partic-
ipating nodes in the communication, the reason for the
higher throughput is not the increased hop count, but the
changing to the best route upon receiving route checking
packets. Thus the throughput of our algorithm is the best.
Figure 10 shows the delivery rate. DSR’s delivery rate
decreases dramatically with increasing device speed. This
is because when the speed increases, cached routes be-
coming stale is more common. In other routing protocols,
the delivery rate has little change with increasing speed.
Figure 11 shows the control overhead required by the
transportation of the routing packets. Again, because of
idleness, DSR has lower control overhead. Our algorithm
has the highest control overhead. The reason is that our al-
gorithm transmits route checking packets to assist ﬁnding
the best path.
In summary, our algorithm has good security and
throughput with the cost of increased routing overhead.
Fig. 8. Average delay.
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Fig. 9. Average throughput.
Fig. 10. Average rate of successful delivery of packets.
Fig. 11. Average control overhead.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a multipath routing algorithm
to enhance the TCP security in ad hoc wireless networks.
The simulation results show that MTS outperforms DSR
and AODV not only in data security but also TCP perfor-
mance.
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